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1. Introduction 
As per the BIS (2010), one of the main reasons that plunged the world in an economic and financial 
crisis in 2007, was the excessive level of leverage in and out of the balance sheets of banks. 
Simultaneously, several banks in various countries had gradual erosion in the quality of their capital 
basis and lacked sufficient liquidity reserves to cope up. The banking sector was not able to absorb the 
huge systemic losses of the respective economies nor respond to the enormous exposures created by 
shadow banking intermediation. Financial institutions are always interlinked by a gamut of 
transactions and the effects of the crisis were cascading. With the aggravation of the crisis, the markets 
lost confidence in the banking sector that had started contracting credit and liquidity affecting thus the 
rest of the economy. Finally, the governments of various countries were forced to intervene to save 
their respective banks, by injecting huge sums of money and giving guarantees, exposing in this way 
the tax-payers to massive losses. 
The effect on the banks and other financial intermediaries of the countries in the epicenter of the crisis 
was immediate, but it spread quickly also to the remaining countries of the globe via indirect channels 
of transmission, resulting in a severe contraction of liquidity and international credit, fall in exports 
and increase in unemployment worldwide. 
With these facts in mind, BCBS, that is represented by the supervisory authorities and central banks of 
twenty seven countries, decided to introduce several fundamental reforms for the regulation of the 
global banking sector. These individual bank reforms (at a micro-prudential level) should help 
maintain the resilience and robustness of the banking sector during periods of financial stress and will 
also have macro-prudential effects covering the entire banking sector, and thus reducing the risks of 
future systemic shocks. These measures, that will strengthen the three pillars of Basel II, introduced in 
2010, are known as Basel III.  
Basel III is the last of the banking regulation agreements proposed in 2010 and that should be 
implemented from 1
st
 of January of 2013 till 1
st
 of January of 2019. This agreement has been devised 
to avoid a repetition of the subprime crisis that led to the 2007 financial crisis. 
With Basel III, an effective control over banking operations should be attained. Banking operations 
had witnessed an excessive growth in the figures shown in the balance sheets, due to credit abuse and 
financial derivatives, together with a gradual deterioration of the quality of assets and capital, or in 
other words, an excessive use of credit risk and risky investments without own resources to cover the 
exposures and without sufficient reserves to face a liquidity crisis. 
As could be seen in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, several banks declared bankruptcy as they were 
linked to other banks that went insolvent. The governments of those countries were forced to prepare 
bailout plans to rescue the banks using public funds and other resources. 
As per BCBS recommendations under Basel III, banks will have to increase their capital reserves to 
protect against future crises. The main recommendations of Basel III are:  
 High quality capital (made up of common equity shares and retained earnings) should increase 
to 4.5% of the risk weighted assets (2% in Basel II) between 2013 and 2015 and be maintained 
at that level. 
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 Minimum tier 1 capital (made up of common equity, retained earnings, preferential shares, 
hybrid instruments of capital and perpetual debt) should reach 6% (4% in Basel II) till 2015 
and be maintained at that level. 
 A capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of the risk weighted assets should be gradually created 
between 2016 and 2019 (0.625% to 2.5%). This reserve will restrain the payment of dividends 
to shareholders and bonuses to banking executives in case the bank is not able to stay above the 
minimum recommended capital ratios. 
 A counter cyclical high quality capital buffer of up to 2.5% of the assets weighted by the 
addition risk could be demanded by the country´s regulatory bodies during credit expansion 
periods.  
 The leverage ratio should be minimum 3%. This ratio will be calculated by dividing the tier 1 
capital by the average total consolidated assets of the bank.    
 A new liquidity coverage ratio has been proposed, under which the bank should have sufficient 
high quality liquid assets to cover all outflows of cash for the next thirty days under a stipulated 
stress regime. 
 A new net stable funding ratio has been proposed. It includes client deposits + long term 
financing + own capital, divided by the long term assets. This ratio should always be 
maintained above 100%. 
The application of these measures hopes to promote stability and efficiency of the banking system, 
reducing this way the chances of banking insolvency. The tier 1 capital is the limit up to which the 
bank is able to absorb its losses without closing down operations and the tier 2 capital is the limit up to 
which the bank is able to absorb its losses in case of insolvency without using the clients funds 
deposited with it. 
In this paper we attempt to study the effect that the recommendations of Basel III will have on the 
capital of fourteen Portuguese banks, using 2012 data. 
 
2. The potential impact of the implementation of Basel III 
The majority of authors quoted in this article agree that the recommendations of Basel III will be 
beneficial to banks, although with some recommend caution in the implementation. 
Based on the banking sector balance sheets for 2010, Härle et al. (2010) estimated that for the full 
implementation of the recommendations of Basel III till 2019, the European banking sector will need 
an addition 1.1 trillion Euros of tier 1 capital, 1.3 trillion Euros of short term liquidity and about 2.3 
trillion Euros of long term funds. The impact on the United States banking sector will be lower (as the 
total assets of American banks is smaller than those of European banks) and it will need about 600 
billion Euros of additional tier 1 capital, 800 billion Euros of short term funds and 2.2 trillion Euros of 
long term funds, respectively. The raising of these additional funds could have a severe impact of the 
profits of the banking sector, reducing the ROE in Europe by four basis points and in the US by about 
three basis points. Most banks are already trying to reduce the impact on the ROE with drastic cost 
reductions and price adjustments, but the most affected will be smaller banks. The authors are of the 
opinion that Basel III is more than just a list of points to be followed in a post-crisis world and 
represents the nucleus of a wave of regulatory changes that will fundamentally affect the functioning 
of the banking sector. Though the implementation phase is quite long, banks should start moving right 
now in order to be able to comply with the recommendations and to return to the profitability levels 
that they had before the introduction of Basel III. 
Arnold, Borio, Ellis and Moshirian (2012) analyzed several problems that have to be resolved to 
promote financial stability. Some of those problems are the measurement of systemic risk and the 
contribution of financial institutions individually for the same, the proprieties of the financial cycle and 
the pro-cyclical effect, indicators that show the accumulation of factors could result in a financial crisis 
and the importance of liquidity and capital for the resilience of the markets. Though some of these 
issues have been covered by Basel III, which is being implemented from 2013, there is a lot that is yet 
to be done in order to understand the real impact of the systemic risk and how a policy to control it 
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should be elaborated. This should be one of the biggest challenges for the banking sector in the coming 
years, for both researchers as well as policy-makers.   
In their study, Antão e Lacerda (2011) proved that the Euro zone banks were highly leveraged and 
were thus not able to absorb credit and market losses that ended up being paid by the tax-payers of the 
respective countries, resulting in drastic reductions of industrial production and increase in 
unemployment. This study of these authors was based on the implementation of BCBS 
recommendations in 2008 for Basel II, that were at that time a considerable change in regulatory 
capital and economic risk. They are of the opinion that Basel III will strengthen the recommendations 
of Basel II. 
Cabral (2013) showed in his study that prior to the 2007-2008 crisis, the profits of the global banking 
sector were very high but the results from financial intermediation were quite low. He argues that the 
high profits were obtained by the expansion of the balance sheets and the divergence between the non-
fulfillment, liquidity and term risk between assets and liabilities. The large banks started growing but 
became less liquid creating in this way the conditions needed for a banking crisis. This kind of 
financial leverage was possible due to Basel I. The author feels that the recommendations of Basel III 
and the Dodd-Frank Act
1
, in the U.S. will help in controlling the situation and avoid a future relapse, 
as they impose greater constraints in the financial intermediation activity. He further states that it is 
essential for every country to do a cost benefit analysis of the government expenditure and of the 
banking sector activities, particularly on the chances of insolvency, liquidity, spreads and others, 
instead of depending only on the recommendations of Basel III on the levels of banking capital and 
liquidity. 
Similarly, Chortareas, Girardone e Ventouri (2011) studied a sample of banks from twenty two 
countries between 2000 and 2008 to understand the impact of the regulatory and banking supervision 
on the development, profitability, stability and corruption in banks. Their results show that the 
regulations on capital restrictions and official supervision of banks can increase efficiency of banking 
operations but evidence also shows that intervening supervision and regulatory policies that involve 
banking control by regulatory authorities and restriction in certain banking activities can result in 
higher levels of inefficiency. The authors came to the conclusion that intervening supervision and 
regulation may have a more significant effect in countries with higher quality of financial institutions 
as compared to poorer countries, but also reiterate that given the financial crisis, a certain level of rigor 
in banking supervision should be maintained by every country.  
Nucu (2011), in a comparative study of the effect of the implementation of Basel III in Romania and 
the European Union, feels that the recommendations of the BCBS are certainly applicable to a post-
crisis world. The reforms proposed are of prudential levels that seek to reduce the occurrence of 
systemic shocks in future. He expects a fall of 3.7 to 4.3 percentage points in the ROE of European 
Union banks from the current level of 15%. The reduction in American banks will be lower, as those 
banks are smaller than European banks. The effect on Romanian banks will be minimal, as their capital 
is composed by about 80% tier 1 instruments and so increase in capital shall be insignificant. 
Rossignolo, Fethi and Shaban (2012) after conducting a study of the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain) concluded that the economic success of these countries at the beginning of the XXI century 
was a direct result of the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in the majority of EU 
countries. This resulted in a fast and excessive increase in credit due to low interest rates as compared 
to the rates of interest that were applied to the old weaker currencies of these countries. The capital 
markets rose as a bubble and contributed to an increase in GDP levels never seen in the PIGS. The 
PIGS´ banks did not have enough capital reserves accumulated to cover any exposure risk that could 
arise in case of a sudden crash of the markets while still fulfilling the requirements set-up by the 
respective central banks. The result was a cascading fall of the banking sector in the PIGS during this 
financial crisis. In order to avoid such an occurrence in future, BCBS recommended the 
implementation of Basel III at a global level. This proposal represents a crucial phase in the 
strengthening of the capital rules that manage banking operations, in order to avoid another systemic 
                                                          
1
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed on 21
st
 of July of 2010. 
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crisis in future. Though theoretically correct, these measures seem to have certain limitations and may 
not be sufficient to ensure banking viability. The banks in the PIGS may be forced to increase even 
further their high quality capital beyond the Basel III recommendations in order to survive. 
The study conducted by Yan, Hall and Turner (2012) shows that the probability of a financial crisis in 
industrialized as well as developing countries is 4 – 5% annually and results from the vulnerability of 
the banking sector, especially when banks have low levels of high quality capital, few liquid assets and 
scarce sources of financing. Their study was based in the U.K. and shows that British banks are above 
the minimum 7% recommendation (including the capital conservation buffer) of Basel III, as they 
range in the 10% levels. The study also suggests that British banks will increase their dependency on 
ordinary capital beyond the recommendations of Basel III and will incentivize client deposits as a form 
of financing banking operations.  
Shim (2012) says that the cyclical provision to be created by banks as proposed in Basel III should 
ensure the needs of capital of the banking sector taking into consideration the macroeconomic sector of 
operation. When the economic cycles are in a boom, banks should create reserves that are sufficient to 
ensure stability, as they may experience systemic shocks during recessive economic situations. He 
studied a sample of U.S. banks for the period of 1992: Q1 to 2011: Q3 and concluded that the 
economic cycles have an important role in banking stability. He found a negative relation between 
business cycles and capital provisions. He agrees with the recommendations of Basel III for the 
creation of a countercyclical capital reserve above the minimum recommended levels. This capital 
reserve could be used during recessionary periods without creating any liquidity shortages that could 
affect the bank´s credit operations to the economy that can end up in financial crises.  
Dedu and Nitescu (2012), in their study mention that the financial crisis proved that only auto-
regulation is not sufficient for systemically important institutions and financial markets. It was the 
permissive regulations of central banks that accelerated the growth of the banking sector and resulted 
in the financial crisis. They believe that Basel III will fortify the financial institutions at a prudential 
capital level as well as the liquidity and will create a global banking and financial system much more 
resilient to the systemic shocks seen in the 2008 financial crisis. Basel III is based on micro-level 
prudence, that means in controlling the risk at an individual bank level, resulting in more resilient 
banks to the financial shocks and thus in a stronger and more stable economy in totality.  
Vallascas and Keasy (2012) used a vast empirical sample of European listed banks to identify which 
were the characteristics that could provide coverage against systemic shocks. They came to the 
conclusion that though the imposition of minimum requirements of capital under Basel III may 
increase banking resilience to systemic events, the risks of banks also depend on the ratio of non-credit 
based income and on the growth of assets. They are of the opinion that regulators should impose a 
maximum absolute size to banks, a limit that would depend on the size of the economy, with small 
economies working with small banks that would avoid large exposures outside the country and large 
economies with bigger banks, but still with a limit on the size, to be controlled on a case to case basis.  
Pakravan (2011), in his study of the Basel III recommendations feels that the new regulations should 
bring banks back to their function as financial intermediaries, reducing thus risks and minimizing the 
costs of bank financing, but advises a simple, transparent and accountable implementation of the 
recommendations of BCBS so as not to increase the pressure on banks due to strict capital 
requirements and rigorous regulations, in order to have no negative impact on the economy. 
Cosimano and Hakura (2011) analyzed the impact that the minimum capital requirements of Basel III 
can have on the interest rates of banking loans and on the growth of credit. Their study covered the 
largest one hundred banks and concluded that there will be an increase in the ratio of capital to total 
assets by 1.3 percentage points on a long term basis, implying a reduction in the volume of loans by 
4.6% in developed economies that witnessed a financial crisis between 2007-2009 and by 14.8% in the 
banks of the countries that did not suffer from the said financial crisis, with individual variations 
country wise, thus reducing drastically global economic growth.   
One of the critics of Basel III is Yilmaz (2009) who feels that banking capital regulation will affect the 
credit to the economy, though it may help prevent or even reduce the risk of insolvency of banks. The 
regulation of the banking sector can lead to a shortage of liquidity in the economy affecting all the 
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sectors and thus reducing the GDP of the country. He also noted that the capital recommendations that 
are based on risk (Basel III) change the composition of the bank´s assets and liabilities. Even though 
he considers the recommendations important, he advises prudence in their implementation to avoid a 
negative impact in the economy. 
His point of view is also partially shared by Allen, Chan, Milne and Thomas (2012) who feel that the 
impact of the implementation of Basel III should be much lighter than the opinion of many critics, but 
recommend a careful management of the changes in the business models, processes and management 
to avoid a severe shortage of liquidity in the markets. They agree with many critics that the 
implementation Basel III as proposed by BCBS could drastically reduce the availability of credit and 
reduce economic activity. The main problem will be the adaptation of the financial sector to the new 
regulations. The regulatory authorities should involve banks and investors in the process of 
implementation and change. If this is not done, “the cure could be worse than the disease.” 
Using the data of sixty global banks, Bučková and Reuse (2011) created a balance sheet of a fictitious 
bank to analyze the effect of the recommendation of Basel III on the new ratios, the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LSR) and the NSFR (Net Stable Funding Ratio) that should help maintain the 
necessary minimum liquidity level of banks on a short and long term basis. According to them, 
treasury bonds will become more attractive for banks as long as they continue to carry a weight of 0% 
on the risk weighted assets. European banks may start mixing national treasury bonds with 
international ones that offer high rates of interest in order to reduce the risk weight of their assets. The 
country wide result could be a major demand for long term funds by banks that could make long term 
loans costlier to the economy, as well as increase the rates of interest on long term deposits. They 
recommend caution in the implementation of the recommendations of Basel III in Europe and advise 
European regulators to follow the U.S. example of implementing the recommendations initially only 
on banks that have a significant weight on the banking stability of the country, leaving the smaller and 
cooperative sector banks for a posterior phase of implementation.  
Wignall-Blundell and Atkinson (2010) studied the proposals of Basel III, mainly the impact on the 
capital of banks that are too large to fail and that in the past opted to take unnecessary risks in order to 
grow further. They are of the opinion that the recommendations of BCBS in Basel III, mainly the 
leverage ratio, capital buffer and cyclical provision for estimated losses are excellent. However, Basel 
III does not address properly the fundamental regulatory problem of promises that are inherent in any 
financial system. Banks have the possibility of moving their funds to other sectors like insurance 
activities where the regulation is not as strict and thus manipulate their balance sheet. Similarly, 
shadow banking activity by banks has not been sufficiently addressed in the Basel III 
recommendations and this could result in various types of financial manipulations by banks to reach 
the minimum ratios without any increase in capital. 
Hyun and Rhee (2011) observed that banks can fulfill the regulatory recommendations to increase 
ratios by issuing new shares to the public or by reducing loans. Given the high cost involved in the 
issue of new capital, banks would prefer to reduce loans, usually when the economy is running through 
a crisis. This means that the implementation of Basel III could reduce economic activity in case banks 
opt to reduce credit to their clients in order to reach the minimum ratios. 
In a similar study that covered British banks, Francis and Osborne (2012) noted that the BCBS 
recommendations may not be as effective as expected when banks can fulfill the capital requirements 
by using debt instruments (tier 2 capital) that are cheaper and easier to raise than capital (tier 1 capital), 
that proves costlier in the long run. Banks may try to manipulate their balance sheets to reach the 
minimum requirements of BCBS by increasing the tier 2 capital without altering the tier 1 capital, or in 
other words, without improving capital quality.  
Das and Sy (2012) also feel that banks can manipulate tier 1 and tier 2 capitals by showing lower 
values of risk weighted assets in order to reduce the minimum requirements of capital. A comparison 
made by them of banks in various regions of the world led them to the conclusion that where 
regulatory authorities allow the use of the IRB models, the value of the risk weighted assets is lower 
than in the regions where the credit risk is calculated using the standard method. These variations 
could have damaging results during financial crisis. 
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3. Methodology 
The Portuguese Association of Banks (APB), on 30
th
 of June of 2012, listed 23 domestic banks and 10 
foreign banks as members, out of which 14 published annual reports: 
 Banco Português de Investimento, S.A. (BPI) 
 Banco Comercial Português, S.A. (BCP) 
 Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. (BES) 
 Caixa Económica Montepio Geral (Montepio) 
 Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. (CGD) 
 Banco Finantia, S.A. (Finantia) 
 Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A. (BANIF) 
 Banco de Investimento Global, S.A. (BIG) 
 Banco Invest, S.A. (Invest) 
 Banco Itaú BBA Internacional, S.A. (Itaú) 
 Banco Popular, S.A. (Popular) 
 Banco Santander Totta, S.A. (Santander Totta) 
 Crédito Agrícola, S.A. (Crédito Agrícola) 
 Banco BIC Português, S.A. (BIC) 
Using the consolidated balance sheets, (except in the base of Banco Popular and Banco BIC where 
there was no consolidation), for the year ended on 31
st
 of December of 2012, a study was made for 1
st
 
of January of 2013 of the ratios proposed by Basel III, as per the BCBS document Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (2010). 
To have a more meaningful comparison of individual banks and to reach a more just conclusion that 
eliminates the weight or influence of certain investments in different sectors of activity can have on the 
risk weighing of assets, we used the standard method and not the IRB method that is commonly used 
in the country, as recommended by Banco de Portugal in its notice no. 6/2010 (based on Basel II).  
This study covered the following values and ratios: 
 Risk weighted assets using the standard method (method 1) 
 Tier 1 ordinary capital 
 Tier 1 additional capital 
 Tier 2 capital 
 Total capital 
 Tier 1 ratio 
 Tier 1 total ratio 
 Total capital ratio 
While using the standard method for quantifying the risk weighted assets on the balance sheet, off-
balance sheet and for contingent items, the following weights have to be used: 
Table 1: Risk weights 
TYPE OF ASSET IN THE BANK BALANCE SHEET 
RISK WEIGHT TO BE 
ALLOTED 
Cash and inter-bank loans 0% 
Commercial and other investments 100% a 600% 
Net loans to clients 100% 
Interest due on loans to clients 100% 
Accounts receivable and other assets 100% 
Net fixed assets 100% 
Off balance sheet items (short term) or contingent liabilities (with 
maturity below one year) 
20% 
Off balance sheet items (long term) or contingent liabilities (with 
maturity above one year) 
50% 
Source:http://kdid.org/microfinance-financial-reporting-standards-draft-public-comment/a1-calculating-risk-weighted-
assets 
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In Portugal, the classification of risk weights is based on the internal ratings method that is calculated 
by each bank. Though easier to apply, it does not allow for a fair comparison between banks, as each 
one will define the risk weights based on slightly different ratings. Some Portuguese banks were 
selected for recapitalization by EBA in order to reinforce the stability of the country´s financial 
system. The core tier 1 ratio is calculated in accordance with notice 6/2010 of Banco de Portugal and 
the total risk weighted assets are calculated as 12.5 times the total requirement of funds. The value of 
the core tier 1 is different from the value that would be obtained using the recommendations of Basel 
III for method 2 (IRB) and from the value that would be obtained using the EBA method. As per 
Portugal´s largest bank, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, the Basel III recommendations should be 
implemented in the country from 2014 onwards as per the CRD IV
2
 and till then, banks can use the 
current notice 6/2010.  
Using an excel spreadsheet, the balance sheet items were segregated by their respective weight risks. 
Some of the items had to be restated in order to comply with the recommendations of Basel III in order 
to accommodate the risk weights, as was the case of loans and interest that are not clearly segregated 
in the notes to the accounts and had to be given a risk weight of 100%. 
Cash and balances with other banks and financial institutions were taken with a risk weight of 0% and 
investments in shares of third parties, included in financial assets at fair value as well as financial 
assets held for sale had a risk weight of 300%
3
, as they are mostly investments in stock markets.  
Other bank investments, namely financial assets held for trading, debt instruments and other assets 
held at fair value, other applications with credit institutions, investments held till maturity, investments 
in subsidiaries and affiliates, joint-ventures and non-current assets held for sale had a risk weight of 
100%. The same risk weight was used for tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, current and deferred 
tax assets and other assets of the balance sheet not covered above. 
Deferred tax assets occurring due to temporal differences should be recognized from 1-1-2013 up to a 
maximum limit of 15% of tier 1 capital after all other deductions. The balance has to be deducted from 
the calculation of tier 1 capital. The assets up to the limit of 15% of tier 1capital (that are not deducted) 
carry a risk weight of 250%. 
Off-balance sheet items and contingent liabilities with maturity below one year should have a risk 
weight of 20% and those with a maturity above one year should be weighed at 50%. As Portuguese 
banks do not segregate properly these items clearly in the notes of accounts, the risk weight adopted 
was 50%. 
The sum of all the assets of the balance sheet multiplied by their respective risk weight gives the risk 
weighted assets that is used as the denominator to calculate all the ratios recommended by Basel III.   
The tier 1 capital is the sum of the issued capital and equivalent items (common shares), issue 
premium, retained earnings, loss reserves, other accumulated reserves, deferred tax loss reserves, 
minority interest, negative differences of the first consolidation and negative differences arising on 
revalidation by the equity method. From this sum, some regulatory adjustments are deducted, namely 
goodwill and other intangible assets, deferred tax assets that depend on future profits, cash flow hedge 
reserves, reduction in future estimated loss provisions, gain on sale of securitized assets, non-realized 
gains and losses due to changes in credit risk estimation, assets and liabilities of defined pension 
benefit plans and treasury stock. Reciprocal investments in other financial institutions and investments 
in affiliates above the limit of 10% are also deducted. Deferred tax assets that occur due to temporary 
differences, investments in other financial institutions and mortgage servicing rights (MSR) should be 
recognized from 1-1-2013 up to a maximum limit of 15% of tier 1 capital after deducting all the other 
deductions listed above. The net value obtained is the tier 1 capital (CET 1). 
Additional tier 1 capital is made of issued instruments that do not fall under the definition of tier 1 
capital. In the case of Portuguese banks, this item is mainly made up of perpetual subordinated debt 
with a call option after a minimum of 5 years to be counted from the date of issue. To that are added 
the issue premiums and minority interests on the said instruments. The regulatory adjustments, if any, 
                                                          
2
 CGD annual report of 31-12-2012, pages 529 to 530. 
3
 We tested various risk weights but the change in the results was not significant. 
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as described above, have to be deducted. The net value obtained is the additional tier 1 capital and the 
sum of both above is the tier 1 total capital. 
The tier 2 capital is the sum of all the instruments that are not taken as tier 1 and in Portugal will be 
composed of non-perpetual debt with initial maturity of at least 5 years, respective issue premium, 
issue premium, minority interests on the same, estimated loss provisions up to a maximum of 12,5% of 
the risk weighted assets less the specific regulatory requirements prescribed for this type of debt. The 
net value obtained is the tier 2 capital (CET 2) that when added to the CET 1, makes up the total 
capital. 
 
The tier 1 ratio is calculated as follows:  
      
 ier   capital
 isk weighted assets
 
While the tier 1 total ratio is calculated as under 
      
 ier   capital  dditional tier   capital 
 isk weighted assets
 
The total capital ratio is obtained by the formula: 
    total  
 ier   capital   dditional tier   capital   ier   capital 
 isk weighted assets
 
 
4. Discussion of Results  
Though Basel III has been recommended for global implementation from 1
st
 of January of 2013, 
Portuguese banks still follow notice 6/2010 of Banco de Portugal (Portuguese Central Bank) that 
recommends that the core tier 1, tier 1 and tier 2 ratios be calculated using an internal ratings based 
method of evaluation of the bank´s exposure to credit and other operational risks. In this method, the 
risk weighted assets are calculated as 12.5 times the total requirement of funds. Banco de Portugal has 
prescribed a minimum ratio of 10% for the core tier 1 ratio for 31-12-2012 (9% for 31-12-2011). Thus, 
all Portuguese banks covered under this study, except for BANIF, are above the minimum 
requirements of 10% as on 31-12-2012, as the internal ratings based method is quite flexible and based 
on Basel II recommendations. 
The European Union is working on a European legislation named Credit Requirement Directive IV 
(CRD IV) that will be based on Basel III and that should be implemented from 1-1-2014 onwards. This 
method, while enforcing the same minimum ratios as prescribed by BCBS, may give the option to 
banks to use the standard method of calculation or the internal ratings based method. This is a cautious 
way if implementing the recommendations in order to avoid a contraction of credit in the EU member 
states. 
In this paper, after calculating the ratios prescribed as minimal under Basel III using the data of 2012, 
the banks that surpassed the minimum ratios for 2013 were considered as fulfilling banks, while the 
others that did not reach the minimum levels were considered as non-fulfilling banks. Obviously, if a 
bank is not able to fulfill the minimum ratios for 2013, it will be a non-fulfilling bank for the next 
years unless it reduces its risk weighted assets or increases its capital (Yun and Rhee and Das and Sy), 
as the tier 1 and tier 2 capital ratios keep increasing year after year till 1-1-2019
4
.  
We used the standard method and table 2 below shows the actual ratios of the banks covered under this 
study when compared with the minimum recommendations of Basel III for 1-1-2013, highlighting the 
banks that have positive ratios: 
  
                                                          
4 See annex 4 of Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Bank for 
International Settlements (2010). 
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Table 2: Results of the study 
AS ON  01-
01-2013 
TIER 1 CAPITAL 
ACTUAL & EXCESS/ 
(DÉFICIT) 
TIER 1 TOTAL 
CAPITAL  
ACTUAL & EXCESS/ 
(DÉFICIT) 
 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
ACTUAL & EXCESS/ 
(DÉFICIT) 
 
MÍNIMUM 
VALUES 
FOR  
1-1-2013 (%) 
3,50 4,50 8,00 
 
 ACTUAL 
RATIO 
EXCESS/ 
DÉFICIT
5
 
 ACTUAL 
RATIO 
EXCESS/ 
DÉFICIT 
 ACTUAL 
RATIO 
EXCESS/ 
DÉFICIT 
BPI 3,55 0,05 3,55 (0,95) 6,60 (1,40) 
BCP 1,87 (1,63) 2,05 (2,45) 6,63 (1,37) 
BES 6,70 3,20 6,93 2,45 8,35 0,35 
Montepio 6,50 3,00 6,57 2,07 8,65 0,65 
CGD 5,15 1,65 5,15 0,65 7,48 (0,52) 
Finantia 14,62 11,12 14,62 10,12 19,77 11,77 
BANIF (0,64) (4,14) 0,02 (4,48) 1,60 (6,40) 
BIG 16,40 12,90 16,40 11,90 16,40 8,40 
Invest 7,23 3,73 8,87 4,37 8,87 4,87 
Itaú 7,03 3,53 7,03 2,53 7,36 (0,64) 
Popular 6,82 3,32 6,82 2,32 6,82 (1,18) 
Santander 
Totta 
4,27 0,77 4,28 (0,22) 4,28 (3,72) 
Crédito 
Agrícola 
6,20 2,70 6,39 1,89 7,22 (0,78) 
BIC 8,22 4,72 10,39 5,89 16,04 8,04 
Source:Calculated (HIGHLIGHTED BANKS FULFILL THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1-1-
2013) 
5. Conclusions  
Based on table 2, out of the fourteen banks, only six (highlighted) fulfill the minimum rations 
prescribed by Basel III. Out of the five largest banks operating in the country (BPI, BCP, BES, CGD 
and Santander Totta) only BES has enough capital to satisfy the requirements laid down by Basel III 
till 1-1-2019
6
, in case the capital conservation buffer is not taken into consideration. If we consider the 
capital conservation buffer, the bank is in a comfortable position up to 1-1-2018
7
.  
Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), the largest bank that is mainly state owned is in a relatively 
comfortable position having only a marginal deficit in the total capital that can be easily fulfilled by 
reducing slightly the risk weighted assets or with a marginal increase in tier 1 or tier 2 capitals.  
Santander Totta, an affiliate of the Spanish Santander group shows a slightly weak position in its ratios 
and should control better its risk weighted assets or go for a new issue of tier 1 or tier 2 instruments in 
the near future. BCP and BPI do not have satisfactory ratios for 1-1-2013 when the standard method is 
used. 
From the remaining medium and small banks, only BANIF needs an urgent issue of capital.  
Some other banks like Banco Itaú, Banco Popular (that are affiliates of foreign banks) and Crédito 
Agrícola are in comfortable positions and may have to reduce slightly their risk weighted assets or 
                                                          
5
 The excess or deficit for each of the banks in all the ratios of this table is the difference between the actual value of the 
ratio and the minimum recommendations of Basel III. 
6
 As the actual ratios obtained for this bank exceed the minimal requirements prescribed up to 1-1-2019. 
7
 As the actual ratios obtained for this bank exceed the minimal requirements prescribed up to 1-1-2018. 
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proceed with a marginal increase in total capital in order to fulfill Basel III recommendations, as their 
deficits are minimal. 
Other medium sized and small banks, like Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest, BIC, satisfy majorly all the 
recommendations of Basel III till 1-1-2019
8
, though Montepio only fulfills the requirements with the 
capital conservation buffer included, up to 1-1-2018
9
. As these are small and medium in size, their risk 
weighted assets are low and thus they were able to maintain the quality of their capital. 
As CRD IV has not yet been implemented in Portugal, there should be no contraction in credit to the 
economy in 2013. Any contraction of credit could be seen when implementation becomes compulsory 
and banks may try first to reduce their risk weighted assets in this way rather than go for the costlier 
and time consuming process of issue of new capital instruments or even an increase in credit spreads, 
as mentioned above by Hyun and Rhee (2011). Another point to be noted is whether Banco de 
Portugal will allow the use of the internal ratings method on implementation of CRD IV or will stick to 
the standard method. 
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